Didn’t they see on the news that we’ve ended combat operations?

U.S. troops help repel attack on Iraqi facility

American military personnel helped defend an Iraqi headquarters in Baghdad yesterday:

Sunday’s hour-long assault was the second in as many weeks on the facility, the headquarters for the Iraqi Army’s 11th Division, pointing to the failure of Iraqi forces to plug even the most obvious holes in their security.

Two of the four attackers even managed to fight their way inside the compound and were killed only after running out of ammunition and detonating explosives belts they were wearing.


  1. If the Iraqis have to request US help to stop a car with 7 guys on a division HQ, that doesn’t bode well for the Iraqi Army. I doubt Saddam’s army would have had a problem with this. His guys would have also tracked down the families of those 7 and made a public example of them.

  2. 11 Bravo:

    Read the details. They were not “requested”. They were the MiTT team attached to the 11th IA Div HQ.

    First rule of ROE: Right of self-defense is pre-eminent.

    They were already on scene and engaged per ROE.

    I have my own heartburn with key abilities that I know the ISF is not ready to perform. This is not an illustration of one of them….

  3. I was in the Green Zone on 1/1/09, when the US began turning over security to ISF. The Op I was on had mondo contacts within the US & Coalition Forces, a number of whom were intimately involved in training/mentoring the ISF. At that time there was a sizable dichotomy between what was being said publicly and privately on the ability of the ISF to provide adequate security for the zone. I also have a life long back ground in static security measures and dynamic security practices………needless to say I kept my eyes and ears open, and my “antenna” quivering, as I moved about in the greater Baghdad area.

    I’m not the least bit surprised at stories like this one. In my inexpert observation a tendancy towards slackness and fatalism combined with the endemic “Inshallah” attitude are the curse of the Arab peoples, and make adhering to any modern concept of efficient, effective security practices problematic. In fairness to the Iraqi’s and Palestinians I’ve had extensive interaction with, the factionalised nature of their societies makes security expecially difficult compared to most US/Canadian or Western Euro security paradigms. In short, it’s difficult to tell the players without psychic abilities! Or at least to tell who the players are really loyal to.

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