Without the proper checks and balances, the proposed Desert Protection Force risks devolving into the Fallujah Brigade of 2004, which was intimidated by al Qaeda and the insurgency, and several of whose members assisted or even defected to the insurgency during the assault on the city in the spring of 2004. A Desert Protection Force is a high risk, high rewards proposal that can be made to work with the right planning and execution.
Trying this in areas where we don’t plan on operating in very near term would possibly be a way to test it out without jeopardizing too much. If it fails, we’d not be much worse off than before. If it succeeds, we’ve not only proven the concept but helped secure a previously-open area.
To be honest, I’m more than bit skeptical. But I think it’s worth a try. Sort of a two-for one special where the rewards outweigh the risks.
He also links to an excellent August post at Security Watchtower with a map and details on the border situation. Until these ratlines are throttled, our strategy is going to remain, in large part, whack-a-mole. There will always be an element of that, of course, but the open Syrian border has really kept the moles well-stocked.