U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Andrew McAllister, with Combined Anti-Armor Team 2, patrols in Nawa district, Helmand province, Afghanistan, Oct. 28, 2009. Marines with 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment are deployed with Regimental Combat Team 7 to conduct counterinsurgency operations with Afghan National Security Forces in southern Afghanistan. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. James Purschwitz/Released)

From a story in Marine Times on the new rules of engagement in Afghanistan:

Army, Marine and Afghan National Army troops experienced the effect of McChrystal’s tighter rules directly Sept. 8, when their small outpost in Ganjgal, in Kunar province near the Pakistan border, was blindsided by insurgents.

Three Marines and a corpsman died that day, and a soldier, 41-year-old Sgt. 1st Class Kenneth Westbrook, who was shot through the mouth and neck, died Oct. 7 at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington. An embedded reporter with McClatchy News Service, Jonathan Landay, reported that “U.S. commanders, citing new rules to avoid civilian casualties, rejected repeated calls to unleash artillery rounds at attackers dug into the slopes and tree lines — despite being told repeatedly that they weren’t near the village.”

This sort of thing, like when the Air Force announced it might ‘buzz’ enemy forces instead of bombing them, is ridiculous. Back in June, when new policies regarding fighting near Afghan civilians was announced, I wrote:

Isn’t this the equivalent of deciding that police will not chase criminals so that bystanders won’t get hurt, then publicizing the rule?

It’s bad enough that US troops under enemy fire won’t always get the support they need because of a new policy. But to announce that policy simply invites the enemy to take advantage of it.

Put simply, us being nice to locals won’t work while the bad guys are running around free being mean. First you have to beat down the insurgents as best you can. Then you have to secure the area. Then you make friendly.

No, I’m not advocating that we simply blow up any and all who are even suspected of being insurgents. But we should be prepared to fight to the utmost of our ability. If not, we should get out.

The cynic in Murdoc wonders if we’re going to see the ROE continuing to become more restrictive until we reach a point where even ardent supporters of the war throw up their hands and say “since the rules won’t let us win we should just quit.” It’s already happening in a lot of places.

And I wonder how much of that is intentional.

Cross-border insurgents flood Afghanistan

The expansion of Islamic extremist groups across the Afghanistan-Pakistan region is “the worst I’ve seen it,” with Afghan insurgents receiving help from Iranian operatives and “very possibly” freelancing Pakistani intelligence agents, as well as a small but growing number of “deadly” foreign fighters, said Maj. Gen. Mike Flynn, director of intelligence for Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s headquarters here.

“I wouldn’t say it’s out of control right now, but this is a California wildfire and we’re having to bring in firemen from New York,” said Flynn, who has been tracking Islamic extremism for at least eight years in postings as director of intelligence for Joint Task Force 180 (in Afghanistan), Joint Special Operations Command, Central Command and the Joint Staff.

The U.S. intelligence community estimates that 19,000 to 27,000 insurgents are operating in Afghanistan, a roughly tenfold increase from 2004’s estimate of 1,700 to 3,200

Flynn adds

“When it started to really show again, I believe, was probably somewhere between 2006 and 2007. And we just flat missed the signs. … [W]e were in the middle of that period of time when we were losing in Iraq, and I just think people weren’t paying attention enough, and certainly not listening to the leadership out here at that time.”

Obviously, some of the “people” who were “not listening” well enough were in the Bush administration, which supports the idea that the campaign in Iraq hurt the campaign in Afghanistan. But remember that Nancy Pelosi said, in mid-2005, the the war in Afghanistan was over.

Also, the deals Pakistan made with Taliban and associated groups in 2005-2006 must have had a huge impact. With relatively safe havens to retreat to, not only did the militants and terrorists get a chance to survive that they might not have had in Afghanistan, they got better opportunities to recruit more members. The serious problems that Pakistan’s inability/unwillingness to deal with the tribal areas near the Afghanistan border rarely get much coverage. In my humble opinion, those deals have cost us a lot.

Representatives from eight women's associations meet to discuss possible business training in the town of Qare Qosh in Ninawa province with members of the Ninawa Provincial Reconstruction Team Oct 27. Photo by 2nd Lt. Jeff Orban

Looks like Smalltown, USA, but is actually Mosul, Iraq:

The Ninawa Provincial Reconstruction Team has instituted a program to train women’s associations in Iraq on business administration practices.

Tony Daza, an economics advisor for the Ninawa PRT and representatives from eight women’s associations held an open dialogue Oct. 27 about the details of the training program.

This, my friends, is what victory looks like. Women sitting around a table discussing professional training programs.

“All these women have attended a lot of conferences before on empowerment, but this time they were ready for income generating programs,” said Daza…

“These women have never had access to start a business to generate income of their own,” said Daza. “Success for me with this program is giving these women choices to have their own sources of income.”

There are a lot of people who screamed and yelled and protested and pontificated for years so that these women could not do things like this. And Murdoc’s not talking about the terrorists or fundamentalists in Iraq.

This story has been in the news lately: US Troops Outnumber Taliban 12-1

First of all, US troops don’t outnumber the Taliban 12-1, it’s all NATO and Afghan forces combined that, according to this report, outnumber the Taliban fighters 12-1.

Secondly, as far as I can tell it’s just counting active Taliban militants, not any of the support network. So if they want to provide a meaningful number, it would be better to only count NATO and Afghan combatants.

Third, as the story does point out, two-thirds of the NATO/Afghan number are Afghan military and police, many of which are woefully under-trained and ill-equipped.

Finally, they’re probably not interested in a meaningful number, anyway. They’re probably looking to spread the idea that there are already so many troops in Afghanistan that it’s pointless to send more just because the military wants them.

For all the talk about “the Surge” in Iraq, it was the shift of tactics and the increasing capabilities and use of the Iraqi forces that made the largest difference.

As long as the Taliban types can keep running into Pakistan to rest and re-arm, things are going to be really tough no matter what the ratio is.

5.56 NATO Dimensions

Steve at The Firearm Blog notes British soldiers also complaining about 5.56mm NATO

In the Telegraph:

A survey of more than 50 servicemen who have fought in Iraq and Afghanistan concluded that the 5.56mm calibre rounds used by British soldiers ‘tailed off’ after 300 metres yet half of all Helmand firefights are fought between 300 and 900 metres.

This seems to make sense and be perfectly reasonable. After all, our Special Forces found out pretty much the same thing in 2001. A lot of them switched to the heavier Mk 262 from the M855 green tip.

But then there’s:

Taliban marksmen use powerful 7.62mm ammo for their AK47 machine guns, according to a report of the study in The Sun.

If they’re trying to argue that AKs firing 7.62 Russian are outshooting guys with 5.56mm SA80 rifles, they’re going to have to do a lot of convincing. Since they use the term “machine gun”, maybe they mean the 7.62×54mm used in the PK-series. But then they’re arguing apples and oranges.

Yes, the 5.56 leaves some things to be desired. Particularly out of shorter barrels.

Yes, a heavier intermediate round such as the 6.8 SPC or the 6.5 Grendel would probably do better in a wider range of circumstances, particularly at longer ranges.

Yes, full size rounds like the 7.62×51 fired from a full-length rifle pack quite a wallop.

But let’s not whine about 5.56 at medium to long range and then extol the 7.62 Russian or medium machine gun rounds in the media.

Blackfive povides History Lesson – The Iraq Surge

Jonathon Johnson, an air interdiction agent for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, pilots a Predator B unmanned air vehicle (UAV), April 3, 2009 at the Grand Forks Air Force Base, N.D. The Predator B has been flying and observing flood dangers along the Red River.(DoD photo by Senior Master Sgt. David H. Lipp, U.S Air Force/Released)

Daily transition between battle, home takes a toll on drone operators

Call it combat as shift work, a new paradigm of commuter warfare that is blurring the historical understanding of what it means to go off to battle. And the strain of the daily whiplash transition between bombs and bedtime stories, coupled with the fast-increasing workload to meet relentlessly expanding demand, is leading to fatigue and burnout for the ground-based controllers who drive the drones.

“We have 5,000 years of one type of warfare and only a couple of years of this new kind,” said P.W. Singer, author of “Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century.” “These guys are simultaneously at home and at war. It may be that human psychology isn’t designed for that. We don’t know yet.”

With all due respect (and Murdoc’s got a TON of respect for our guys in uniform), I’m not sure if I’m really buying the “war during the day, home at night” description because the “war during the day” part is nothing like the war that soldiers have fought for the past 5,000 years. Isn’t UAV operation more like air traffic control than infantry?

“It can be very surreal,” Capt. Zeb Krantz, a former C-130 pilot, said about stepping into the ground control station and entering the battle space. “You think: ‘I was just at home this morning.’ ”

What I find surreal are some of the examples:

“The family pressures don’t go away, they heighten,” Singer said. “You’ve just been on a combat mission and half an hour later your spouse is mad at you because you’re late to soccer practice.”

and

For those stationed at Creech, there seems to be an ever-receding finish line. The Air Force hits one target of production only to see it get bumped higher.

and

“It’s hard to forge that esprit de corps, that tribe mentality when you can’t all go to the bar after work and decompress together,” Mathewson said.

and

Overall, Predator and Reaper crews tend to be “tired, disgruntled and disillusioned,” Kent said.

Not to minimize the stress issues, and I have no personal experience to compare it with, but I’m guessing that a lot of troops deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan would be happy to deal with the issues facing drone operators.

(I’m sure I’ve pissed off people here. That wasn’t my intent. What do you guys think?)

Operation Champion Sword, in Khowst province, Afghanistan, Aug. 2, 2009. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Matthew Freire/ Released)

Popular Mechaincs: A deadly day of helicopter accidents in Afghanistan highlights the risks rotorcraft crews face in and out of combat. Is the ride worth the risks?

Helicopters are powerful, fragile machines. They are used heavily every day in Afghanistan, and they stay in the war zone when troops rotate home. Mechanics do their best to keep them in good shape, but the tempo of operations and the conditions make crashes nearly inevitable. In a place like Afghanistan, the terrain is as deadly a foe as the armed enemy.

Helicopters provide some great advantages, but they are vulnerable. I’ve written before about The danger of helicopters:

The same vulnerabilities that attack choppers face make support choppers vulnerable. But despite these problems, the advantages that helicopters provide far outweigh the danger. Air transport has cut down on enemy opportunities to bomb roadways, making our supply lines far more secure. The ability to patrol (and pursue) from the air has undoubtedly contributed to our effort to limit insurgent attacks.

But helicopters remain fragile. And their operating environment and the severity of consequence that mishaps bring make them more than a little dangerous at times.

On that post, a commenter added:

I hate to point this out, but Murdoc, you need to stress one word in this article with a little more emphasis. That word is FRAGILE.

In Afghanistan, many of the risks helicopters bring are accentuated due to the environment.

This is something I meant to post on several weeks back when I first heard of it, but I didn’t get to it. Now Stars & Stripes has a story:

Army to phase in tan-colored Stryker vehicles

More than six years after sending the first Stryker armored vehicles into desert combat, the Army has decided that it’s probably a good idea to start painting them tan so they will blend in with the environments in Afghanistan and Iraq.

“Safeguarding soldiers is the primary purpose for this color change,” said U.S. Army Lt. Col. Peter Butts, commander of the 1st Battalion, 401st Army Field Support Brigade, who announced the change in a news release from Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar, earlier this month. “Strykers will blend into surroundings better. They’re less likely to stand out like silhouettes.”

Since 2003, Stryker units deploying to Iraq have done so with their vehicles painted in deep green, while most other units deployed with tan vehicles.

I’ve often wondered about this, but even now no meaningful reason for the delay is to be found. Given the red tape this probably had to go through, I guess we should consider it lucky that the vehicle itself wasn’t cleared to be painted tan but the slat armor had to stay green.

Something that just seems to make this worse is that now, even though the official decision to go desert tan has been made, it can only be done when the Strykers are in “authorized facilities” in Qatar. No immediate changes for deployed units unless their vehicles are sent back for repair.

Here are some photos of the new colors from earlier this month:

Dar Barker, a General Dynamics Land Systems retrofit chief from Puyallup, Wa., directs an armored combat vehicle outside the Stryker battle damage repair facility at Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar, Oct. 5. The Stryker infantry carrier vehicle had been restored after deterioration during enemy engagement in Iraq. It's the first vehicle to adopt a new desert tan color in Southwest Asia, in preparation for a planned phase out of the Stryker's current deep green color. Photo by Dustin Senger

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